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HARVARD LAW REVIEW.

Published monthly, during the Academic Year, by Harvard Law Students.

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THE LAW SCHOOL. — The following table shows the registration in the School on November 15 for the last twelve years:—

					1890-91.	1891-92.	1892-93.	1893-94.	1894-95.	1895-96.
Res. Grad					. ´—´	<i>^</i>	,	73 74	74 73.	
Third year .					• 44	48	69	66	82	96
Second year					• 73	112	119	122	135	138
First year .					. IOI	142	135	140	172	224
Specials		•			. 61	61	71	23	13	ġ
Total	•	•	•	٠	. 279	363	394	35 1	402	467
					1896-97.	1807-08.	1808-00.	1800-1000	. 1000-01.	7001-02.
Res. Grad					1896-97.	1897–98.	1898-9 9.	1899-1900	. 1900-01.	1901-02.
Res. Grad	•	•		•	. —	I	I		I	ī
Third year .			•		· —	1 130	I 102	134	1 144	1 149
Third year . Second year					· —	I	I		I	ī
Third year . Second year	•	•		•	· 93 · 179	1 130	I 102	134	1 144	1 149
Third year . Second year	:	:	•	:	· 93 · 179	1 130 157	1 102 169	134 193	I I 44 202	1 149 190
Third year . Second year First year .	:	:	•	:	· 93 · 179 · 169	1 130 157 216	1 102 169 218	134 193 232	I I44 202 241	1 149 190 229

For the first time in several years the figures show a slight decrease in the total registration, in the numbers of the first and second year students, and in the relative per cent. of those returning to the second and third year classes. This decrease is largely due to the stricter requirements for admission and to the rule that a student who fails to pass in two courses cannot return.

The following are the usual tables showing the sources from which twelve successive classes have been drawn, both as to previous college training and as to the geographical districts from which they have come: -

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HARVARD	GRADUATES.

Class of	From Mas- sachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.
1893	34	I	19	54
1894	30	2	17	49
1895	32	4	13	49
1896	23	7	17	47
1897	27	2	15	44
1898	42	I	25	68
1899	45	6	19	70
1900	50	11	30	91
1901	45	3	28	76
1902	59	2	28	89
1903	43	4	28	75
1904	47	5	17	69

GRADUATES OF OTHER COLLEGES.

Class of	From Mas- sachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.
1893	5	Q	21	3 5
1894	7	20	38	65
1895	8	14	30	52
1896	14	11	45	70
1897	9	I 2	56	77
1898	19	23	Ğ2	104
1899	2Í	12	45	78
1900	30	19	60	109
1901	27	22	5 9	107
1902	22	20	δí	112
1903	23	<u> 2</u> 6	83	132
1904	25	20	74	128

HOLDING NO DEGREE.

Class of	From Mas- sachusetts.	New England outside of Massachusetts.	Outside of New England.	Total.	Total of Class.
1893	4	I .	7	I 2	101
1894	20	I	10	31	142
1895	16	3	14	33	135
1896	10	4	9	23	140
1897	26	7	16	49	170
1898	25	2	25	52	224
1899	11	2	8	21	169
1900	11	2	3	16	216
1901	25		9	34	218
1902	25 18	4	9	31	232
1903	21	I	12	34	240
1904	22		10	32	229

The thirty-two men in the first year class holding no degree are Harvard seniors who in each instance however have completed the work required for the Harvard A. B. degree. Thus it may be said that all the members of the first year class are virtually college graduates. The same is true of nearly 99 per cent. of all the members of the School, since, other than Harvard seniors, seven special students are the only men in the School who have not received a degree. Of the fifty-nine special students twenty-six are here for the first time this year, and of these twenty-five are college or university graduates, five having received the LL. B. degree.

There are now in the School graduates of ninety-two colleges and universities, as compared with eighty-two last year and seventy-six the year preceding. In the present first year class forty-four colleges and universities, as compared with forty-seven last year, are represented as follows: Harvard, 69; Yale, 25; Brown, 19; Dartmouth, 11; Williams, 6; Bowdoin, Chicago. 5; Amherst, California, Tufts, 4; Northwestern, Wisconsin, 3; Centre, Cincinnati, Cornell, Georgetown University, Iowa, Minnesota, Princeton, Vermont, Washington and Jefferson, Western Reserve, 2; Bethany, Central, Colorado, University of Colorado, Earlham, Franklin and Marshall, Gates, Georgetown, Haverford, Illinois Wesleyan, Indiana, Leland Stanford, Jr., McGill, Michigan, Mt. Vernon, Ohio State, University of Pennsylvania, Pomona, St. Joseph's, Syracuse, Tulane, Vanderbilt, 1. There are at present in the School thirteen Law School graduates, of whom seven have received both academic and law degrees, representing the following twelve Law Schools: Buffalo, Centre, Cincinnati, Georgetown University, Harvard, Iowa (2), Indiana, Missouri, Northwestern, Texas, and Western Reserve.

RECOVERY FOR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM NERVOUS SHOCK. — It is interesting to note the trend of judicial opinion on the question of allowing recovery for injuries resulting from nervous shock. There is little discussion where the defendant acts wilfully, but where his act is merely negligent, the courts have adopted widely dissimilar views. In New York, Massachusetts, and the English Privy Council the right to recover has been denied. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107; Spade v. Lynn, etc., R. R., 172 Mass. 488; Victorian Ry. v. Coultas, L. R., 13 App. Cas. 222. In South Carolina, Minnesota, and Ireland strong decisions have been rendered in the plaintiff's favor. Mack v. South, etc., R. R., 52 S. C. 323; Purcell v. St. Paul, etc., Ry., 48 Minn. 134; Bell v. Great, etc., Ry., 26 L. R. Ire. 428. In a recent English case the defendant's servant negligently drove a van through the window of the room in which the plaintiff was sitting. There was no physical contact, but the court allowed an action, as the plaintiff's fright was such as to cause a miscarriage two months later. Dulieu v. White, 1901, 2 K. B. 669.

The opinion of Kennedy, J., compact and forceful, goes far towards overcoming the objections upon which the contrary decisions are The statement that there is no general duty of care not to frighten others, he argues, is too broad. There is a duty not to injure The only question is whether there is an actionable breach of such duty if one is made ill in body by negligence which does not break his ribs, but shocks his nerves. In answer to the objection that as fright is not actionable so no consequence of fright can be, he quotes Sir Frederick Pollock, that "Fear taken alone falls short of being actual damage, . . . because it can be proved and measured only by physical effects," and where measurable damage does result, it is evident that its primary cause was the act which produced the fear, not the fear itself. On the question of remoteness Kennedy disagrees with the Coultas decision. asserts that if the injury follows the shock as its direct and natural effect, even though not immediate in point of time, it is still a proximate consequence of the shock. The grounds of public policy are lastly examined, and dismissed as insufficient to bar the plaintiff in meritorious